

THE ABSTRACT BOOK

**WHAT IS GENDER, Vol. II: NOW INCLUDING SEXUALITY,
INTERSECTIONALITY, AND TRANS IDENTITY**

SEPTEMBER 7–10, 2021, MANCEPT Workshops of Political Theory

Convenors: Rowan Bell, Katrina Haaksma, Sofie Vlaad, and Jaana Virta
all times UTC times

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7TH: THE METAPHYSICS OF GENDER

15.30 – 16.30 **Katelijne Malomgré** – “An Intersectional and Historical Critique of the Gender Category Approach in Gender Metaphysics”

17.00 – 18.00 **Michael Davin** – “Gender and Reification: Reading Sally Haslanger as a Marxist Feminist –

18.15 – 19.15 **Jay Luong & Stephania Donayre Pimentel** – “Gender Meta-Trouble”

19.45 – 21.15 **KEYNOTE: Louise Antony** – “Amelioration is Impossible and (Fortunately) Unnecessary”

KATELIJNE MALOMGRÉ:

An intersectional and historical critique of the gender category approach in gender metaphysics

One of the main goals in feminist theory, and especially within the field of gender metaphysics, is to identify and explain the logic of gender and the mechanism of gender oppression. Taking a closer look at how the debate has evolved in the past few decades, Elizabeth Barnes (2020) makes an interesting observation: among feminist philosophers who work towards a theory of gender, it has become common practice to understand the problem of explaining gender as the task of giving application conditions for gender terms. This is a mistake, says Barnes. For one, she argues that there are philosophical reasons for distinguishing the task of revealing underlying social patterns from theoretical considerations concerning how we use or understand certain words. But also on a more political level, Barnes takes issue with the conflation of explaining gender with explaining the use of gender terms. She contends that failing to see how the two come apart, has led feminist theory into wrong directions entailing insurmountable problems of exclusion and endless debates over definitions. Instead, Barnes proposes an alternative and profoundly metaphysical reading of the social positions account.

I agree with Barnes that giving a theory of gender can and should be distinguished from giving application conditions to gender terms. At the same time, it doesn't seem obvious to me that the task of clarifying the mechanisms of gender and gendered oppression should coincide with or be limited to a metaphysical analysis of how individuals or groups of people make up gender categories, as Barnes proposes. I will argue that historical and sociological data (see for example Oyèrónké Oyěwùmí's (1997) cultural and historical critique of Western gender thought) provide good reasons to acknowledge that gender works through a gender saturated worldview, where much more than individuals alone are being gendered. As a result, I contend, understanding the metaphysics of gender as a matter of merely explaining gender categories is a partial undertaking at best. In order to grasp what gender is and how it works, I will argue that Western feminist theory should challenge the way in which it has come to understand its foundational question 'what is gender?'. I will propose that a common interpretation of the task at hand – the assumption that gender should be explained through a theory of gender categories, or as I will call it: the gender category approach

– is in dire need of revision. Instead of steering gender metaphysics toward a social positions account of gender categories as Barnes does, I defend a gender metaphysics that dares to abandon a universalist impulse, and that puts intersectionality and a historically sensitive gendered worldview central.

Barnes, E. (2020). Gender and gender terms. *Noûs*, 54(3), 704-730.

Oyěwùmí, O. (1997). *The invention of women. Making an African sense of Western gender discourses.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

MICHAEL DAVIN:

Gender and Reification: Reading Sally Haslanger as a Marxist Feminist

This presentation will argue that a social position account of gender cannot succeed in articulating the relationship between the construction of gendered individuals and the practices and political efforts required to eliminate gendered oppression if it conceives of gender as an individual property. In this presentation, I will reconstruct Haslanger's account of gender using reification as a critical tool from the Marxist philosophical tradition, developed from the work of György Lukacs. I will argue that we should build a dual view of theoretical tools that examine both reified gender categories as well as the material structures and relations from which they emerge, and that this dual analysis allows us to restore the intuitive link between feminist metaphysical inquiry and feminist praxis.

Sally Haslanger's work has set a template for much of the contemporary philosophy of gender, in attempting to tie together the descriptive analysis of the world in the tradition of post-Quinean metaphysics with a critical, ameliorative attitude which extends this programme to social reality and its description in social theory. A central component of this project is her 'social position' account of gender, as a kind constituted through relations of systematic subordination and privilege on the basis of one's role in reproduction.

However, a number of objections to Haslanger's account seem to stem from the use of this underlying ontological structure. In accepting Haslanger's effort to produce an operative analysis of gender in thoroughly political terms, we face difficulties in understanding how to relate the account of gender which emerges to the kinds of actions that eliminate the subordinated position described, given, for example, Haslanger suggests that we ought to eliminate women categorised as such in her account. Second, in presenting 'woman' as a kind to which people are members of based on their social position, Haslanger's account leaves the possibility of individuals being problematically excluded from a category around which their political recognition and personal identity is organised, an objection generally called the particularity argument.

Both the political and ontological difficulties of conceptualising social kinds such as 'woman' could be resolved by the application of reification as a tool from Marxist philosophy. Reification describes the phenomenon whereby a social relation between people assumes the appearance of a property of an object. Applying this to a social position account of gender, we would proceed from an analysis of womanhood as manifest, reified property of individuals to the operative social relations that have given rise to this property. Rearranging the account in this way directly connects Haslanger's descriptive analysis to the materialist feminist politics that inspired her project, while avoiding the unintuitive political imperatives that it has produced. Given this possibility, I will ask whether existing tools within analytic social ontology, such as Ian Hacking's dynamic nominalism, provide us with the means of accommodating the necessary revisions, and argue that a kind of 'dialectical realism' in Hacking's terms provides a satisfactory answer to both our political concerns and the problem of the particularity objection.

JAY LUONG & STEPHANIA DONAYRE PIMENTEL:
Gender Meta-Trouble

Sally Haslanger offers the following concept of “woman”: If one is perceived as being biologically female and in that context one is subordinated owing to the background ideology, then one “functions” as a woman (Haslanger 2012). While there are many ways of inquiring about gender, Haslanger’s project is distinctly analytical in nature: It aims to consider more fully the pragmatics of utilizing the terms in question for political and theoretical purposes (Haslanger 2012). One implication of this account is that if someone does not “pass” as their self-identified gender, they do not function as that gender socially. Therefore, one could object to this ascriptive account of gender by arguing that it wrongly undermines the gender identities of some trans people. In this paper, I will argue that Haslanger’s definition can be defended against this objection and that her account inevitably aids in liberatory efforts not only for cisgender women, but for all sexual and gender minorities.

Katherine Jenkins offers a dual account of gender—gender as class and gender as identity—to rectify this objection (Jenkins 2016). While her concept of gender as class is based on Haslanger’s proposed target concepts of “woman” and “man”, her concept of gender as identity is as follows: “S has a gender identity of X iff S’s internal ‘map’ is formed to guide someone classed as a member of X gender through the social material realities that are, in that context, characteristic of Xs as a class” (Jenkins 2016: 410). I argue that her concept of the “internal map” is problematic in that a) Its existence presumably results from environmental or biological factors—both of which have troubling implications, and b) It is not inclusive of the experiences of all trans people (in fact, I argue, no account can be fully inclusive unless it is wholly subjective). Additionally, despite her objection, I argue that her account ultimately has the same implication as Haslanger’s: that we ought to eliminate the categories “woman” and “man”.

Finally, I argue that Haslanger’s account is meant to show how gender functions in the social world to produce injustice. She is describing the current reality of gender as a system that crudely forces people into two categories where one group dominates the other. One lamentable fact about this system is that not everyone functions as their self-identified gender in the social world. The fact that this system does not categorize some people in accordance with their self-identified gender, however, is not a flaw in Haslanger’s account. If anything, the fact that her conception of gender recognizes this ought to be regarded as a virtue of her account: it more accurately tracks the ways in which gender is currently an unjust social institution. Thus, her account shows how our current system of gender not only oppresses cisgender women, but many trans people as well.

Works Cited

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Jenkins, Katharine, 2016, “Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of *Woman*”, *Ethics*, 126: 394-421.

Keynote: **LOUISE ANTONY:**
Amelioration is Impossible and (Fortunately) Unnecessary

I want to challenge both the feasibility and the desirability of conducting an “ameliorative” project, and argue that what we really should be focusing on is *institutional* definitions of key terms.

Amelioration is impossible: I begin with the following question: what can a concept be such that it can undergo and survive change? Amelioration requires concepts to have individuation conditions such that a concept can stay the same while its extension changes, and I know of no account of concepts that can satisfy that requirement, except the LOT account, which individuates concepts syntactically. Another problem with the notion of amelioration is that it presupposes some prior account of what determines a concept’s extension, and all of the most popular such accounts either don’t work (nec. and suff. conditions; patterns of use) or else don’t support the possibility of conceptual change: (Kripke/Putnam/Boyd accounts: ostension + tacit similarity relation; “reference magnetism”). Quine’s critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction looms throughout.

Amelioration is unnecessary: It’s a general constraint on an adequate account of concepts that it be compatible with (a) the possibility of error, and (b) the likelihood of semantic indeterminacy. I will argue that either of these possibilities, taken in conjunction with an atomic conception of concepts, gives a better explanation of what’s at stake in debates about what it is to be a woman than does “difference in concepts.” (Briefly: (a) people can be *mistaken* about what it is to be a woman, and (b) whatever determines the extension of WOMAN may not reach through all of logical space.)

Finally, I’ll argue (with thanks to Magdalene Dimitriou) that the things that *can* be changed, and that *do* have important effects on human lives, are the *institutional social kinds* created by explicit institutional definitions of terms. (Cf. Mallon and Ásta). These regulate social behavior in ways that are independent of how people conceive of things, and don’t require any change in belief about things. This can be regarded as a form of metalinguistic negotiation; the case of “marriage” in US and Canadian law is instructive here.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 8TH: THE METAPHYSICS OF INTERSECTIONALITY

15.00 – 16.00 **Dee Payton** – “Gender and Race: Doing Metaphysics Without Language”

16.15 – 17.15 **Marta Jorba & Dan López de Sa** – “Intersectionality as Emergence”

17.30 – 18.30 **Kevin Richardson** – “Gender Pluralism and Gender Indeterminacy”

19.00 – 20.30 **KEYNOTE: Sara Bernstein** – “Intersectional Oppression as Proportionate Causation”

**DEE PAYTON:
Doing Metaphysics Without Language**

What is it to be a woman? What is it to be Black? These are central questions in the philosophy of gender and the philosophy of race, respectively. In these literatures, questions about gender and race are often taken to be questions about terms and concepts. We ask: what does ‘woman’ mean? What, if anything, do our race concepts map onto in the world? In this essay I argue that when we understand these questions as being exclusively about terms and concepts we miss that there are other questions to be asked here, too—questions about people, and the ways those people are. For the purposes of this essay, I’ll talk in terms of properties when I’m describing the ways people are (properties like the property of being a woman, or the property of being Black). Overlooking this distinction between terms and concepts on the one hand, and properties on the other, can cause problems in the philosophies of gender and race.

I will work with three examples to highlight those issues here: one from the literature on the metaphysics of race, one from the literature on gender and semantic contextualism, and one from the literature on gender metaphysics. I’ll use these examples to show three things: (1) that this distinction between terms and properties is relevant to discussions about gender and race; (2) that this distinction between terms and properties is sometimes overlooked in these same discussions; and (3) that this distinction is overlooked in these discussions causes problems.

The intended upshot of my project is a friendly one, however: I think that theorizing with this distinction in mind could improve the work we do in these literatures, and for every problem I raise here, I propose a corresponding solution. As such, the reader will find no knock-down objections to the projects considered here, only (what I hope will be) constructive critiques and workable suggestions which will help us to cover all of the relevant bases in these discussions about gender and race, not just the ones which concern terms and concepts.

**MARTA JORBA & DAN LÓPEZ DE SA:
*Intersectionality as Emergence***

Intersectionality was introduced by the legal scholar and Black feminist Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989), although intersectionality-like thought was already present in Black feminist activism (Hancock 2016). In the general discussion about intersectionality there are arguably different related thoughts that have been significant both in theory and in practice and that have been formulated in various ways. We aim to provide an articulation of the core thoughts that will prove fruitful and useful in addressing many— even if not all—of the issues raised in connection with intersectionality. These are nicely summarized by Cho, Crenshaw and McCall (2013), in the introduction to their edited recent volume ‘Towards the Field of Intersectionality Studies’ (our emphasis):

As intersectionality has traveled, questions have been raised regarding a number of issues: (...) the additive and autonomous versus interactive and mutually constituting nature of the race/gender/class/sexuality/nation nexus; the eponymous “etcetera” problem—that is, the number of categories and kinds of subjects (e.g., privileged or subordinate?) stipulated or implied by an intersectional approach; and the static and fixed versus the dynamic and contextual orientation of intersectional research. (Cho, Crenshaw and McCall 2013: 787)

Our articulation is in terms of the emergence of experiences of discrimination and privilege. The proposal thus has three main ingredients: a general conception of intersectionality, and the notions of emergence and

experience in context, which we elaborate in the first part of the paper. We contend that the notion of emergence provides a useful articulation of intersectionality as a general metaphysical frame where intersecting experiences of discrimination may interact non-additively. Crucially, the frame allows without requiring such non-additive interactions. This is again in line with Crenshaw's original take (1989, 149), but contrasts with some other frequent formulations in the literature.

We invoke a notion of weak emergence, and of emergence of properties (rather than particulars), which is compatible with physicalism and which bypasses complicated issues concerning (ir)reducibility. Our account will have it that whenever society arranges itself as to make a certain category relevant vis-à-vis discrimination and privilege, the corresponding experience emerges—and with it, all the consequent intersectional experiences, making the non-additive interactions possible. Finally, our focus is in the emergence of experiences (rather than the underlying categories), relative to context in various ways.

In the second part of the paper we illustrate what we take to be some of the main virtues of our proposal vis-à-vis some alternatives in the literature. We contend that the view has three main virtues: metaphysical neutrality, explanatory flexibility and methodological openness. Explaining them will allow us to contrast our proposal with extant alternatives in the recent literature, such as Bernstein (2020) and Gasdaglis and Madva (2020), as well as offering a response to the “etcetera problem:” although attending to the intersectional insight is certainly not inconsequential in that it requires a certain kind of sensitivity, we will argue that it does not lead to (theoretical or practical) paralyzing consequences—in the context of the law, and elsewhere.

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KEVIN RICHARDSON:

Gender Pluralism and Gender Indeterminacy

Gender pluralism is the view that there are multiple gender kinds, where these kinds extend beyond the usual assortment of *man*, *woman*, *non-binary*, and so on. For example, some gender kinds are intersectional (e.g., *Black woman*). Other gender kinds are location- or culture- based (e.g., *American woman*). Gender kinds may also be individuated by their political content, like Bettcher (2013)'s distinction between dominant and resistant gender kinds.

Gender pluralism is generally coupled with contextualism about gender terms (Saul, 2012; Bettcher, 2013; Diaz-Leon, 2016; Dembroff, 2018; Barnes, 2020). According to contextualism, gender terms— like “woman” or “genderqueer”—refer to contextually salient gender kinds, where the salient gender kinds can change from context to context. As a package, pluralism and contextualism represent an increasingly popular account of the metaphysics and semantics of gender.

If gender pluralism is true, what should we say about the unity of particular genders? For example, is there such a thing as a unified kind *woman*? A radically pluralist answer to this question is simply: no. A more moderate view says that there is a kind *woman*, but it is unanalyzable or disjunctive (Mikkola, 2006, 2016; Antony, 2020). The goal of this paper is to argue for a different answer to this question: namely, that there is a kind *woman*, but in many cases, it is indeterminate whether an individual is a member of that kind.

More generally, I argue that gender is indeterminate in the sense that: for some gender kind *g*, there will be cases in which there is no settled fact of the matter about whether an individual is a member of *g*. I claim that gender is indeterminate in two ways.

Metaphysically, gender is indeterminate because there are multiple, equally natural gender kinds. Say that a kind is *metaphysically natural* to the extent that it cuts nature at its joints (Lewis, 1983; Sider, 2011). There will be some gender kinds *woman₁* and *woman₂* that are equally natural because, as far as nature is concerned, they are equally good ways of representing individuals. Because there is no way to break the tie between such kinds, I conclude that we should take *woman* to simply be indeterminate in cases where those kinds give different verdicts about individuals.

Semantically, gender *terms* do not always determinately apply because there is not always a fact of the matter about which gender kind is contextually salient. The objective features of a speech situation, I argue, do not always uniquely identify the gender kinds under discussion. People may have conflicting beliefs or lack fully determinate assumptions about gender. In such cases, there will be indeterminacy in what we mean by “*woman*” in a given context.

By relaxing the assumption of fully determinate gender kinds (and gender meanings), we free ourselves from the burden of having to make sense of what gendered individuals have in common, and we do so without resigning ourselves to the unanalyzability of gender. Furthermore, gender indeterminacy has a political upshot; even if our politics should orient around the kind *woman*, as opposed to more fine-grained gender kinds, it does not follow that this kind must be fully determinate.

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Keynote: SARA BERNSTEIN

Intersectional Oppression as Proportionate Causation

I offer a new way to understand the causal status of intersectional oppression. In the first part of the talk, I argue that social categories are literally causal: they are causes and effects. Social categories like Black figure into social counterfactuals and support social explanations. Social categories can also count as ontologically fundamental, on a certain conception of fundamentality.

In the second part of the talk, I suggest that different "levels" of social reality have differentially detailed causal profiles. For example, the category Black womanhood has a more detailed causal profile than womanhood or Blackness. Drawing on Stephen Yablo's idea that causes are proportionate to their effects in terms of causal detail, I argue that intersectional oppression can be understood as involving causation containing the appropriate level of causal detail.

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 9TH: THE METAPHYSICS OF TRANS IDENTITY

15.30 – 16.30 Richard Rowland – “A Desire-Based Account of Gender Identity”

16.45 – 17.45 B.R. George & R.A. Briggs – “What kind of question is ‘what is gender?’?”

18.00 – 19.00 Jasper Heaton – “Gender Identity and Transfeminism as Realism”

19.30 – 21.00 KEYNOTE: Marquis Bey: “Notes on (Trans)Gender: Autotheoretical Meditations on the Trans, the Cis, and the Black —Toward Abolition”

RICHARD ROWLAND:

A Desire-Based Account of Gender Identity

I propose a new desire-based account of gender identity according to which for A to have gender identity G is for A to non-instrumentally desire that they and/or others treat them as a G. Where the relevant conception of what it is to treat someone as a G is A's conception. There are two reasons to accept this view. First, it provides a plausible and informative account of what it is to have a non-binary gender identity in a way that alternative views do not. On this view, for A to have a non-binary gender identity is for A to desire that they and/or others not treat them as a member of a binary gender. One way to treat someone as a member of a binary gender is to use binary pronouns. Another is to subject them to various norms associated with the gender they were assigned at birth such as norms regarding appearance and clothing.

There are three alternative accounts of gender identity in the literature: Bettcher's, Jenkins', and McKittrick's. Bettcher's account does not provide an informative account of non-binary identity since it understands gender identities in terms of self-identification (to have gender identity G is to self-identify as a G) but many do not understand what it is to self-identify as non-binary. Jenkins understands gender identities in terms of internal normative maps. But the normative maps of some trans women and some non-binary people are very similar. So, Jenkins' account cannot adequately distinguish between non-binary and trans gender identities and I argue that it should. Whilst Dembroff has argued that McKittrick's account either overgenerates or undergenerates non-binary identities.

Second, gender identities are tied up with desires and motivation. Many trans women talk simultaneously both about having a female gender identity and wanting to be a woman. And people who realize that they have a gender identity out of line with the gender they were assigned at birth are very often motivated to change features of their lives such as how they are socially referred to or categorized, how they present themselves to others, or how their body looks. The desire-based account explains this link between gender identity and motivation but alternative accounts cannot. Bettcher's account cannot because we can self-identify as something without being motivated in any way; e.g. some people self-identify as fat but don't want to be referred to as fat. Jenkins' account does not explain this link either since on her view one can have gender identity G just because one takes the norms associated with Gs to be relevant to one even if one completely disowns these norms and is not motivated to conform with them at all.

I further argue that the desire-based account, or a slightly revised version of it, shows that gender identities merit respect in a way that McKittrick's account cannot. If this is right, there are two reasons to accept the desire-based account over each alternative account of gender identity in the literature.

B.R. GEORGE & R.A. BRIGGS:
What kind of question is 'what is gender?'

Both scholarly and popular discourse about gender are full of seemingly incompatible claims about what counts as evidence of gender, and about what gender really is. In the world of slogans, gender may be "between your ears, not between your legs" or "the social interpretation of sex". Instances of gender may include "woman" and "man", or "feminine" and "masculine". In feminist theory, gender may be (or be constituted by) a social status, the repetition of certain acts/performances, or a system of social structures and social relations. In the medicalization of trans identity, "experienced/expressed gender" may be evidenced by everything from a preference for certain "toys, games, or activities", to feelings about one's "sexual anatomy", to convictions about what "feelings and reactions" are typical of men or women (examples taken from DSM-5). TERF propaganda would have us understand debates about trans rights in terms of a conflict between the view that gender is a pernicious value system or hierarchy to be dismantled, and the view that it is something internal and personal to be respected and celebrated.

We contend that "what is gender?" is the wrong question. Although many seemingly incompatible accounts of gender pick out real psychosocial phenomena, excessive focus on determining which things deserve to be called "gender" encourages false assumptions: that these phenomena are not really distinct; that insofar as they are distinct, one must be more legitimate and important than the others; and that a person's attitudes toward different phenomena must "match". The pervasive "what is gender?" framing constitutes a hermeneutical injustice against trans and gender nonconforming people, obscuring distinctions that are indispensable for making our needs and experiences intelligible to others – and sometimes to ourselves. Further, attempts to address the problem by subdividing "gender" into "gender identity", "gender expression", and "gender roles" do not adequately address this problem.

We introduce a new taxonomy of gender-related phenomena. We consider different candidate referents for existing "gender" talk, beginning with material traits and behaviors, and social categories like "woman", "man", and "nonbinary". After introducing these ingredients, we consider norms and stereotypes connecting them, along with individual attitudes and dispositions about how we relate to them. We divide up the subject matter of gender by combinatorially exhausting ways of building norms and personal relationships from our basic ingredients (so that, e.g., one's sense of one's own relationship with various physiological traits can be

distinguished from one's sense of one's relationship with various social categories, which can in turn be distinguished from the norms regulating the connection between those traits and those categories). This kind of increased granularity has the power to alleviate many of the harmful confluences typical of traditional "gender" talk. We show how, from the point of view of this sort of taxonomic project, some ostensible disputes about the nature of gender disappear entirely, while for others it at least becomes easier to articulate what is at stake.

Keynote: MARQUIS BEY

**Notes on (Trans)Gender: Autotheoretical Meditations on the Trans, the Cis, and the Black —
Toward Abolition**

This talk will attempt to theorize a radical otherwise through the "trans," an otherwise that reaches toward an abolitionist politics. Through thinking trans, cis, and blackness—which are all, in turn, thought in an autotheoretical way through the author—to be conveyed in this talk is an argument for "(trans)gender," the mobilization of a gender misalignment that is not simply confined to a certain embodiment but, instead, a politicized penchant for abolishing the normative tenets of gender as such.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 10TH: THE METAPHYSICS OF SEXUALITY

15.00 – 16.00 **Tessel Veneboer** – "What Does Gender Want?"

16.15 – 17.15 **Matt Andler** – "What Is Masculinity?"

17.45 – 18.45 **Esa Díaz-Leòn** – "Sexual Orientations, Sexual Desires, Sex, and Gender"

19.00 – 20.30 **KEYNOTE: Talia Bettcher** – "Personhood, Gender, and Moral Sex"

TESSEL VENEBOER

What does gender want?

The performativity of gender and the experience of sexuality are separate but always in conversation with each other. Gender is not only an identification with one sex it also entails that sexual desire be directed toward the other sex (Rubin 1984). Judith Butler (1990) underlines that sexual "orientations" are rarely, if ever, fixed. Both gender and sexuality are components of subject formation. In *Undoing Gender* (2004) Butler asks what gender might want, a strange question "unless we realize that the social norms that constitute our existence carry desires that do not originate with our individual personhood".

The metaphysics of gender is always also a metaphysics of sexuality. How does gender come into existence through desire? How can we think gender and sexual orientations together? Desiring someone implies wanting to be perceived in a certain, gendered, way and this want is part fantasy and idealization. Kaja Silverman (1996) has argued that those deconstructing gender have made a serious mistake in arguing against idealization, "that psychic activity at the heart of love, rather than imagining the new uses to which

it might be put.” Ideality powers identification and is therefore a crucial component of the identificatory process.

The potential of “ugly feelings” (Ngai 2005) such as envy, idealization, and jealousy are as much constitutive of gender as “positive” desires such as wanting to “be a woman” – and feeling that you can be that. Both performativity of gender and heterosexuality are a repetition of codes (Preciado 2018) but cannot function without fantasy and idealization. For Lauren Berlant (2012) the incoherence of libidinal activity presents “a model of the desiring subject who is decentered or unstable; that identity itself, whether sexual or gendered, is therefore an always failed project in that it is always aspirational and determined by multiple, diverse, divergent aims.”

To ask what gender is, thus, not only implies the question of how one identifies oneself, but also how the desires of the subject-in-form come into existence. But desiring is not necessarily an emancipating process, it is informed – pushed back even – by social norms. For Butler (2004), the condition of the subjectivation is regulated by this tension: “If my doing is dependent on what is done to me, the ways in which I am being done by the norms, then the possibility of my persistence as an “I” depends upon my being able to do something with what is done with me.” Establishing the self as a desiring subject is a gendered experience that is inscribed by social norms, including the moral value attached to unwanted desires such as envy, idealization, and jealousy. In this presentation I will think about the ways gender comes into being through desire, in particular these uncomfortable desires.

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MATT ANDLER: *What Is Masculinity?*

In this paper, I’ll argue for the following interrelated claims regarding the explanatory role and real definition of masculinity.

- (1) Explanatory Role: The concept of masculinity plays an important role in the explanation of normatively significant social phenomena such as manspreading and catcalling.
- (2) Real Definition: Masculinities are homeostatic property cluster kinds in which binary gender structures partly explain property co-occurrence.

In respective sections, I’ll argue for (1) and (2), which together amount to a theory of masculinity. Then, I’ll explicate the ameliorative implications of the Homeostatic Property Cluster Kind Theory of Masculinity.

In particular, in (§1), I’ll argue that the masculinity, in part, explains why individual men act in accordance with sexist social norms, e.g., social norms involving access to public space (in the case of manspreading) as well as social norms involving the autonomy and attention of women (in the case of catcalling). Masculinity, in this way, bridges the personal and structural dimensions of gender.

Next, in (§2), I'll explicate the phenomenon of homeostatic property cluster kinds, before considering incel masculinity and playboy masculinity as case studies in masculinity. Ultimately, I argue in favor of expanding the metaphysical taxonomy of gender phenomena to include gender archetypes such as masculinity and femininity, which (on my view) are homeostatic property cluster kinds in which binary gender structures partly explain property co-occurrence.

To conclude, in (§3), I'll explicate the dynamics of political projects that aim to mitigate the misogynistic harms associated with toxic masculinity. More specifically, I'll argue that the homeostatic property cluster kind theory of masculinity provides reason to engage in revisionary – as opposed to eliminativist – projects in masculinity.

**ESA DIÁZ-LEÓN:
Sexual Orientations, Sexual Desires, Sex, and Gender**

William Wilkerson (2013) wrote: “we can ask a question not usually raised by your average person: does sexual orientation attach to sex, gender, or both?” (p. 197). He argued that although the ordinary notion of sexual orientation seems to appeal to attraction in virtue of someone's sex, there are good reasons to broaden this concept to include gender too. For instance, he considered the cases of butch/femme lesbian relationships, where butch lesbians are attracted to femme lesbians and femme lesbians are attracted to butch lesbians, that is to say, butch lesbians are attracted to people who are biologically female and have a feminine gender presentation, whereas femme lesbians are attracted to people who are biologically female and have a masculine gender presentation, and therefore, we need a concept of attraction on the basis of gender expression in order to capture these preferences. On the other hand, Kathleen Stock (2019) has argued that a concept of sexual orientation that involves attraction to people in virtue of their sex only is part of the “orthodox view” of sexual orientation, and “an important means of classifying human subjects” (p. 295). In this talk, I want to further explore this question. First, I will survey some recent characterizations of the relevant notions of sex, gender, and sexual orientation as a disposition. Second, I will review some recent answers to the question above offered by Wilkerson (2013), Bettcher (2014), Dembroff (2016), and Stock (2019). Finally, I will argue that we have good reasons (drawing on Wilkerson 2013, Bettcher 2014 and Dembroff 2016, and *contra* Stock 2019) to favor a characterization of sexual orientation as attraction to people in virtue of their sex *and* gender, rather than in virtue of their sex *alone*.

**Keynote: TALIA BETTCHER:
Personhood, Gender, and Moral Sex**

In this talk I elucidate my concept of moral sex and explain why I prefer it to the concept of gender. Among other things, I show how the concept of moral sex is useful in illuminating the connection between personhood and certain aspects of what some have called “gender.” By ‘moral sex’ I mean the notions of male and female as they (A) pertain specifically to men, women, boys, girls, and nonbinary individuals; and (B) are understood and deployed by ordinary folk in everyday (non-scientific) discourse. More deeply, however, I understand moral sex as a differentiation in the boundary structures that makes intimacy and distance possible in our system of “interpersonal spatiality” (i.e. the characteristic of all our sensory and informational encounters to admit of closeness, distance, and something in-between).