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Convenors<\/strong><\/p>\n Micha\u0142 Rupniewski<\/strong> (Faculty of Law and Administration, the University of Lodz, Poland); michal.dru@gmail.com<\/a><\/p>\n *All times are British Summer Time (BST)<\/p>\n 3pm \u2013 6:40pm <\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cThomas Aquinas on human action\u201d \u2013 Magdalena P\u0142otka<\/strong> (Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw)<\/p>\n \u201cFree will as the ontological basis of a system of right in Hegel\u2019s legal philosophy.\u201d \u2013 Eduardo Charpenel<\/strong> (Universidad Panamericana, CDMX)<\/p>\n \u201cOn the metaphysics of personhood: liberty spaces, ability spaces, and contingency\u201d \u2013 Micha\u00ebl Bauwens<\/strong> (University of Antwerp)<\/p>\n \u201cThe biological hypothesis on freedom\u201d \u2013 Emanuele Martinelli<\/strong> (University of Zurich)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n 9am \u2013 12:40pm <\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cHabermas on language, social evolution and ethics of genetic engineering\u201d \u2013 Kamil Aksiuto<\/strong> (Maria Curie-Sklodowska University in Lublin)<\/p>\n \u201cIndeterminist free will, conscious choice, and unconscious cognition\u201d \u2013 Simon Kittle<\/strong> (University of Leeds)<\/p>\n \u201cPredictive evidence in criminal trials: why criminal law should treat people as if they have unpredictable free will\u201d \u2013 Amit Pundik<\/strong> (Tel Aviv University)<\/p>\n \u201cDilemmas of legal personhood: a personalist response\u201d \u2013 Micha\u0142 Rupniewski<\/strong> (University of Lodz)<\/p>\n 3pm \u2013 6:40pm <\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cHannah Arendt on the space of appearance: a critical analysis\u201d \u2013 Micha\u0142 Rupniewski<\/strong> (University of Lodz)<\/p>\n \u201cThe \u2018right to rebel\u2019 in early China \u2013 civil disobedience, human agency, and moral authority in classical Chinese philosophy\u201d \u2013 Lisa Indraccolo<\/strong> (Tallin University\/University of Zurich)<\/p>\n \u201cKant\u2019s cosmopolitanism and the value of humanity \u2013 implications for a universal right to citizenship\u201d \u2013 Ewa Wyr\u0119bska-Dermanovic<\/strong> (University of Bonn\/University of Bayreuth)<\/p>\n \u201cNon-critical reason, non-moral responsibility, and the social status of higher animals\u201d \u2013 Jon Garthoff<\/strong> (University of Tennessee)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n The aim of the workshop is to scrutinize human personhood, or human agency, with a view to its implications for politics and the law. Traditionally, the unique character of the human being, manifesting itself in human actions, was taken for granted. Recent decades have put this well-established picture into a serious doubt. On the one hand, human conduct has been subject to analyzes and explanations that may possibly replace the traditional metaphysical categories of free will or autonomy. On the other, the research on non-human animals shows their mutual relations as more complex, and more resembling human social morality, than traditionally conceived. While some are quite happy about it and prefer to “naturalize” our notions of human agency (and thus are likely to treat non-human animals or AIs as \u2018agents\u2019 to an extent similar to humans), some are still maintaining that the human being, with her unique personhood and dignity, is the primary focus and aim of legal and political systems. This dispute constitutes an opportunity for both sides to sharpen their arguments, and to establish a better understanding of their key claims. Once these refinements are made, the question must be asked: how the changes in conceiving of human agency influence the concepts and developments within political and legal institutions? The following particular issues appear particularly important in this regard:<\/p>\n Contributions from political theorists, lawyers, ethicist, philosophers, and cognitive scientists are welcome. The workshop is indented to gather and confront divergent points of view on the issue.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n [\/et_pb_text][\/et_pb_column][\/et_pb_row][\/et_pb_section]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The Disputes on Human Agency: Implications for Politics and Law Convenors Micha\u0142 Rupniewski (Faculty of Law and Administration, the University of Lodz, Poland); michal.dru@gmail.com *All times are British Summer Time (BST) 09 September 2021 Session 1 : Ontological commitments of agency 3pm \u2013 6:40pm \u201cThomas Aquinas on human action\u201d \u2013 Magdalena P\u0142otka (Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3596,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"on","_et_pb_old_content":"Convenors<\/strong>\r\n\r\nMicha\u0142 Rupniewski<\/strong> (Faculty of Law and Administration, the University of Lodz, Poland): michal.dru@gmail.com<\/a>\r\n\r\n
\n09 September 2021<\/h4>\n
Session 1 : Ontological commitments of agency<\/em><\/h6>\n
10 September 2021<\/h4>\n
Session 2: Agency, society, and the law<\/em><\/h6>\n
\u00a0<\/h4>\n
Session 3 : Agents in the sphere of the political<\/em><\/h6>\n
\n
\r\n\r\nThe aim of the workshop is to scrutinize human personhood, or human agency, with a view to its implications for politics and the law. Traditionally, the unique character of the human being, manifesting itself in human actions, was taken for granted. Recent decades have put this well-established picture into a serious doubt. On the one hand, human conduct has been subject to analyzes and explanations that may possibly replace the traditional metaphysical categories of free will or autonomy. On the other, the research on non-human animals shows their mutual relations as more complex, and more resembling human social morality, than traditionally conceived. While some are quite happy about it and prefer to \"naturalize\" our notions of human agency (and thus are likely to treat non-human animals or AIs as \u2018agents\u2019 to an extent similar to humans), some are still maintaining that the human being, with her unique personhood and dignity, is the primary focus and aim of legal and political systems. This dispute constitutes an opportunity for both sides to sharpen their arguments, and to establish a better understanding of their key claims. Once these refinements are made, the question must be asked: how the changes in conceiving of human agency influence the concepts and developments within political and legal institutions? The following particular issues appear particularly important in this regard:\r\n\r\n \t