[et_pb_section fb_built=”1″ admin_label=”section” _builder_version=”3.0.47″][et_pb_row admin_label=”row” _builder_version=”3.0.48″ background_size=”initial” background_position=”top_left” background_repeat=”repeat”][et_pb_column type=”4_4″ _builder_version=”3.0.47″ parallax=”off” parallax_method=”on”][et_pb_text admin_label=”Text” _builder_version=”3.17.6″ background_size=”initial” background_position=”top_left” background_repeat=”repeat”]<\/p>\n
Convenors<\/strong><\/p>\n Michele Giavazzi<\/strong> (University of Genoa); michele.giavazzi@edu.unige.it<\/a><\/p>\n Carline Klijnman<\/strong> (University of Genoa); carline.julie.francis.klijnman@edu.unige.it<\/a><\/p>\n *All times are British Summer Time (BST)<\/p>\n 13.45 – 14.00<\/strong><\/p>\n 14.00 – 15.00<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cDemocratic Participation and the Value of Epistemic Blame\u201d \u2013 Cameron Boult<\/strong>\u00a0 (Brandon University)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n 15.30 – 16.30<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cIndividual Epistemic Obligations for In-Group Epistemic Wrongdoing\u201d \u2013 Magnus Ferguson<\/strong>\u00a0 (Boston College)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n 17.00 – 18.00<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cThe Epistemic Responsibilities of Voters: A Joint Agency Account\u201d \u2013 Michele Giavazzi<\/strong> (University of Genoa)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n 14.00 – 15.00 <\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cEpistemic Rights and Epistemic Duties: Analysis and Taxonomy\u201d \u2013 Lani Watson<\/strong> (University of Oxford)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n 15.30 – 16.30<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cDemocratic Citizens, Indirect Diachronic Abilities and Second-Order Epistemic Responsibilities\u201d \u2013 Deven Burks<\/strong> (University of Luxembourg)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n 17.00 – 18.00<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cMetacognitive Responsibilities of Democratic Citizens\u201d \u2013 Sergiu Spatan<\/strong> (University of Hamburg)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n 14.00 – 15.00<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cProcedural Epistemic Responsibilities of Democratic Citizens\u201d \u2013 Carline Klijnman<\/strong> (University of Genoa)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n 15.30 – 16.30<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cPolitical Accountability and the Epistemic Responsibilities of Voters\u201d \u2013 Finlay Malcolm<\/strong> (University of Hertfordshire)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n 17.00 – 18.00<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cAre Knowledgeable Voters Better Voters?\u201d \u2013 Michael Hannon<\/strong> (University of Nottingham)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n 18.00 – 18.15<\/strong><\/p>\n \n Contemporary democratic societies face a variety of political challenges. Some of these challenges display a distinctive epistemic dimension. Developments in communication technologies, for instance, have\u00a0 changed the way information is produced, shared, and consumed by democratic citizens. On the one hand, much politically relevant information has become more easily and instantly accessible. On the other hand, democratic citizens have to gather this information under suboptimal epistemic circumstances, characterized by widespread misinformation, political polarization and sometimes a perceived lack of epistemic authority. In light of the challenging nature of these epistemic circumstances, inquiring about the epistemic responsibilities of democratic citizens has become increasingly relevant. Depending on the account from which these responsibilities are endorsed, there might be significant implications relating to democratic legitimacy. For instance, epistemic critics of democracy question the legitimacy of democracy precisely because they deem democratic citizens to be uninformed, unmotivated or epistemically irresponsible. Epistemic democrats, on the contrary, express optimism about the collective epistemic performance of democratic citizens. They tend to put less emphasis on individual competence and argue in favor of the epistemic merits of democracy. Finally, others urge caution against placing too much significance on The workshop will take place across three half-days, on 7 th – 9 th September 2021.<\/strong><\/p>\n Confirmed speakers:<\/strong> Prospective speakers should submit a short abstract (max. 250 words) and an extended abstract (max. 1000 words). Submissions should be made suitable for 30 minutes presentations. [\/et_pb_text][\/et_pb_column][\/et_pb_row][\/et_pb_section]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The Epistemic Responsibilities of Democratic Citizens Convenors Michele Giavazzi (University of Genoa); michele.giavazzi@edu.unige.it Carline Klijnman (University of Genoa); carline.julie.francis.klijnman@edu.unige.it *All times are British Summer Time (BST) \u00a07\/9\/2021 Welcome 13.45 – 14.00 1 : Democratic Participation and the Value of Epistemic Blame 14.00 – 15.00 \u201cDemocratic Participation and the Value of Epistemic Blame\u201d \u2013 Cameron Boult\u00a0 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3596,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"on","_et_pb_old_content":"Convenors<\/strong>\r\n\r\nMichele Giavazzi<\/strong> (University of Genoa) michele.giavazzi@edu.unige.it<\/a>\r\n\r\nCarline Klijnman<\/strong> (University of Genoa) carline.julie.francis.klijnman@edu.unige.it<\/a>\r\n\r\n
\n\u00a07\/9\/2021<\/h4>\n
Welcome<\/em><\/h6>\n
1 : Democratic Participation and the Value of Epistemic Blame<\/em><\/h6>\n
2 : Individual Epistemic Obligations for In-Group Epistemic Wrongdoing<\/em><\/h6>\n
3 : The Epistemic Responsibilities of Voters: A Joint Agency Account<\/em><\/h6>\n
\u00a08\/9\/2021<\/h4>\n
4 : Epistemic Rights and Epistemic Duties: Analysis and Taxonomy<\/em><\/h6>\n
5 : Democratic Citizens, Indirect Diachronic Abilities and Second-Order Epistemic Responsibilities<\/em><\/h6>\n
6 : Metacognitive Responsibilities of Democratic Citizens<\/em><\/h6>\n
\u00a09\/9\/2021<\/h4>\n
7 : Procedural Epistemic Responsibilities of Democratic Citizens<\/em><\/h6>\n
8 : Political Accountability and the Epistemic Responsibilities of Voters<\/em><\/h6>\n
9 : Are Knowledgeable Voters Better Voters?<\/em><\/h6>\n
Concluding remarks<\/em><\/h6>\n
the epistemic responsibilities of citizens in the first place. From their standpoint, considerations of epistemic responsibility are secondary to other procedural commitments, such as political equality or inclusiveness. Depending on one\u2019s position in this debate, one might argue for a more or less demanding account of epistemic responsibilities \u2013 if any. This workshop aims to shed light on possible accounts of epistemic responsibilities of democratic citizens. We will welcome submissions related to the following questions (broadly construed):<\/p>\n\n
Dr. Cameron Boult<\/strong> (Brandon University)
Dr. Michael Hannon<\/strong> (University of Nottingham)<\/p>\n
Please send your submissions, with files prepared for blind review, to epistemic.mancept@gmail.com<\/a> by May 7 th<\/strong> . We aim to notify prospective speakers of our decision by the 31 st of May.<\/strong><\/p>\n
\r\n\r\nContemporary democratic societies face a variety of political challenges. Some of these challenges display a distinctive epistemic dimension. Developments in communication technologies, for instance, have\u00a0 changed the way information is produced, shared, and consumed by democratic citizens. On the one hand, much politically relevant information has become more easily and instantly accessible. On the other hand, democratic citizens have to gather this information under suboptimal epistemic circumstances, characterized by widespread misinformation, political polarization and sometimes a perceived lack of epistemic authority. In light of the challenging nature of these epistemic circumstances, inquiring about the epistemic responsibilities of democratic citizens has become increasingly relevant. Depending on the account from which these responsibilities are endorsed, there might be significant implications relating to democratic legitimacy. For instance, epistemic critics of democracy question the legitimacy of democracy precisely because they deem democratic citizens to be uninformed, unmotivated or epistemically irresponsible. Epistemic democrats, on the contrary, express optimism about the collective epistemic performance of democratic citizens. They tend to put less emphasis on individual competence and argue in favor of the epistemic merits of democracy. Finally, others urge caution against placing too much significance on\r\nthe epistemic responsibilities of citizens in the first place. From their standpoint, considerations of epistemic responsibility are secondary to other procedural commitments, such as political equality or inclusiveness. Depending on one\u2019s position in this debate, one might argue for a more or less demanding account of epistemic responsibilities \u2013 if any. This workshop aims to shed light on possible accounts of epistemic responsibilities of democratic citizens. We will welcome submissions related to the following questions (broadly construed):\r\n\r\n \t