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Convenor<\/strong><\/p>\n Marcus Arvan<\/strong>\u00a0(University of Tampa): marvan@ut.edu<\/a> *All Times are British Summer Time (BST)<\/span><\/p>\n 14.00-14.30<\/strong> \u2013 Welcome and Introductions<\/p>\n 14.30-15:25<\/strong> \u2013 \u201cPrudence in Kant\u2019s Political Philosophy\u201d \u2013 Tom Bailey<\/strong> (London School of Economics)<\/p>\n 15.30-16.25<\/strong> – \u201cPowerless Dystopian Populations and the Limits of Political Prudence\u201d \u2013 Adriano Mannino<\/strong> and Marina Moreno<\/strong> (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich & Solon Center for Policy Innovation)<\/p>\n 16.30-17.25<\/strong> – \u201cThe Logic of Prudence\u201d \u2013 Manali Kumar<\/strong> (Universit\u00e4t St. Gallen)<\/p>\n 17.30<\/strong> – Continued Discussion \/ Social Gathering<\/p>\n 15.00-15.55<\/strong> – \u201cRespect and Reasonable Pluralism about Prudential Rationality\u201d \u2013 Michael Cholbi<\/strong> (University of Edinburgh)<\/p>\n 16:00-16.55<\/strong> – \u201cNudging for Changing Selves\u201d \u2013 Richard Pettigrew<\/strong> (University of Bristol)<\/p>\n 17.00<\/strong> – Continued Discussion \/ Social Gathering<\/p>\n 15.00-15.55<\/strong> – \u201cFrom Prudence to Liberal Moral Values: A Hole in Cofnas\u2019s Debunking Argument of Moral Progress\u201d \u2013 Marcus Arvan<\/strong> (University of Tampa)<\/p>\n 16.00-16.55<\/strong> – \u201cReasonability Facades: A Flaw in the Deliberative Model of Democracy\u201d \u2013 Clair Baleshta<\/strong> (University of Guelph)<\/p>\n 17.00<\/strong> – Continued Discussion \/ Social Gathering<\/p>\n 14.00-14.55<\/strong> – \u201cEdgelording: Provoking Criticism through Offense\u201d \u2013 Mark Bowker<\/strong> (University College Dublin)<\/p>\n 15.00-15.55<\/strong> – \u201cThe Spirit of Inaction: Benjamin Constant on the Abyss of Reflection\u201d \u2013 Jialin Liang<\/strong> (University of Chicago)<\/p>\n 16.00-16.30<\/strong> \u2013 Coffee break\/social<\/p>\n 16.30-17.25<\/strong> – \u201cThe Prudence of Rooting out Extremism in the US Military\u201d \u2013 Ruby Tamariz<\/strong> (Independent Scholar \/ US Air Force Officer)<\/p>\n 17.30<\/strong> – Continued Discussion \/ Social Gathering<\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n Considerations of prudence plausibly underlie a number of important political debates. Consider, for example, debates between moderates, progressives, and conservatives about social and political change. Moderates often allege that radical approaches to change are likely to backfire by alienating swing voters in the political center. Conversely, progressives often allege that moderates imprudently set back the cause of justice by playing into the <\/span>status quo<\/span><\/i>. Finally, Burkean conservatives contend that radical change is unwise because it can have\u2014and has a history of having\u2014catastrophic unintended consequences.<\/span><\/p>\n Considerations of prudence also appear to be latent within certain forms of liberal political theory. For example, although John Rawls does not explicitly couch his project in prudential terms, Rawls\u2019 primary concern in <\/span>Political Liberalism<\/span><\/i> is to provide a theory of justice that can explain how a deeply pluralistic society can remain stable and non-oppressive over time. Similarly, in <\/span>The Law of Peoples<\/span><\/i>, Rawls provides a theory of international law and practice for how diverse peoples can live <\/span>peacefully<\/span><\/i> with each other in a reasonably just world.\u00a0 An idea arguably implicit in both works is that it would be <\/span>imprudent<\/span><\/i> to pursue any conception of domestic or international justice that cannot be expected to realize reasonably stable and peaceful conditions in a diverse and pluralistic world\u2014or what Rawls telling terms a \u2018realistic utopia.\u2019 Finally, prudence looms large in many applied political debates, such as how to deal best with climate change, terrorism, pandemics, and the development of artificial intelligence. For example, is it prudent to wage a \u2018war on terror\u2019, or is such a war only likely to produce more terrorists and bloodshed? Would experimenting with technological forms of climate engineering be an imprudent risk? Were COVID lockdowns prudent, or an imprudent form of short-term political thinking?<\/span><\/p>\n However, as pervasive as concerns about prudence appear to be in political debates, there has been comparatively little theorizing about prudence and politics. In recent years, an increasing number of philosophers have developed novel theories of prudence. For example, in <\/span>Choosing for Changing Selves<\/span><\/i> (Oxford University Press, 2019), Richard Pettigrew defends a detailed framework for making prudent life-choices in an ever-changing world. Similarly, in <\/span>A Theory of Prudence<\/span><\/i> (OUP, 2021), Dale Dorsey purports to give a comprehensive theory of prudence. However, the implications of prudence for political theory and practice are relatively underexplored. In <\/span>Neurofunctional Prudence and Morality: A Philosophical Theory<\/span><\/i> (Routledge, 2020), Marcus Arvan outlines a unified theory of prudence, morality, and justice informed by behavioral neuroscience, holding that prudence and morality ultimately support a broadly Rawlsian conception of justice as fairness. However, in <\/span>In the Shadow of Justice<\/span><\/i> (Princeton University Press, 2019), Katrina Forrester argues that Rawlsian liberalism is ill-suited to our current political moment: a volatile time of political crises in which more radical forms of political theorizing and action may be more (prudentially?) effective in achieving important forms of social and political change.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n This MANCEPT panel invites submissions on prudence and politics broadly understood, including but not limited to the implications of theories of prudence for political theory and activism, as well as applied discussions of prudence and political issues (climate change, etc.). Contributions are welcome from a range of disciplines, including but not limited to philosophy, political science and theory, economics, sociology, and law.<\/span><\/p>\n Paper Submissions<\/b>:<\/b> This workshop is organized and convened by Dr. Marcus Arvan (University of Tampa). Papers will be given a 55 minute slot, consisting of a 35 minute paper and a 20 minute Q&A. To submit a paper plase send an abstract of 250 words to <\/span>marvan@ut.edu<\/span><\/a> by the deadline of 15th May 2021.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n Given the continued uncertainty with the C-19 pandemic, and the success of hosting the 2020 workshops online, <\/span>MANCEPT be holding this year\u2019s event online<\/b>. MANCEPT offers fee-waiver bursaries to attend the conference (available for current graduate students only), and the application deadline for a bursary is 15 June 2021<\/strong>. To give presenters time to apply for one, authors chosen for the workshop will be informed of their paper acceptance by 8<\/strong><\/span> June 2021.<\/strong><\/p>\n [\/et_pb_text][\/et_pb_column][\/et_pb_row][\/et_pb_section]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Prudence and Politics Convenor Marcus Arvan\u00a0(University of Tampa): marvan@ut.edu *All Times are British Summer Time (BST) Tuesday 7th September 14.00-17.30 – Session 1: The Logic and Limits of Prudence 14.00-14.30 \u2013 Welcome and Introductions 14.30-15:25 \u2013 \u201cPrudence in Kant\u2019s Political Philosophy\u201d \u2013 Tom Bailey (London School of Economics) 15.30-16.25 – \u201cPowerless Dystopian Populations and the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4408,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"on","_et_pb_old_content":"Convenor<\/strong>\r\n\r\nMarcus Arvan<\/strong>\u00a0(University of Tampa): marvan@ut.edu<\/a>\r\n<\/span>\r\n\r\n
<\/span><\/p>\n
\nTuesday 7th September<\/h4>\n
14.00-17.30 – Session 1: The Logic and Limits of Prudence<\/em><\/h6>\n
Wednesday, 8th September<\/h4>\n
15.00-17.00 – Session 2: Prudence and Liberalism<\/em><\/h6>\n
Thursday, 9th September<\/h4>\n
15.00-17.00 – Session 3: Prudence, Democracy, and Moral Progress<\/em><\/h6>\n
Friday, 10th September<\/h4>\n
14.00-17.30 – Session 3: Prudence and Extremism<\/em><\/h6>\n
\r\n\r\nConsiderations of prudence plausibly underlie a number of important political debates. Consider, for example, debates between moderates, progressives, and conservatives about social and political change. Moderates often allege that radical approaches to change are likely to backfire by alienating swing voters in the political center. Conversely, progressives often allege that moderates imprudently set back the cause of justice by playing into the <\/span>status quo<\/span><\/i>. Finally, Burkean conservatives contend that radical change is unwise because it can have\u2014and has a history of having\u2014catastrophic unintended consequences.<\/span>\r\n\r\nConsiderations of prudence also appear to be latent within certain forms of liberal political theory. For example, although John Rawls does not explicitly couch his project in prudential terms, Rawls\u2019 primary concern in <\/span>Political Liberalism<\/span><\/i> is to provide a theory of justice that can explain how a deeply pluralistic society can remain stable and non-oppressive over time. Similarly, in <\/span>The Law of Peoples<\/span><\/i>, Rawls provides a theory of international law and practice for how diverse peoples can live <\/span>peacefully<\/span><\/i> with each other in a reasonably just world.\u00a0 An idea arguably implicit in both works is that it would be <\/span>imprudent<\/span><\/i> to pursue any conception of domestic or international justice that cannot be expected to realize reasonably stable and peaceful conditions in a diverse and pluralistic world\u2014or what Rawls telling terms a \u2018realistic utopia.\u2019 Finally, prudence looms large in many applied political debates, such as how to deal best with climate change, terrorism, pandemics, and the development of artificial intelligence. For example, is it prudent to wage a \u2018war on terror\u2019, or is such a war only likely to produce more terrorists and bloodshed? Would experimenting with technological forms of climate engineering be an imprudent risk? Were COVID lockdowns prudent, or an imprudent form of short-term political thinking?<\/span>\r\n\r\nHowever, as pervasive as concerns about prudence appear to be in political debates, there has been comparatively little theorizing about prudence and politics. In recent years, an increasing number of philosophers have developed novel theories of prudence. For example, in <\/span>Choosing for Changing Selves<\/span><\/i> (Oxford University Press, 2019), Richard Pettigrew defends a detailed framework for making prudent life-choices in an ever-changing world. Similarly, in <\/span>A Theory of Prudence<\/span><\/i> (OUP, 2021), Dale Dorsey purports to give a comprehensive theory of prudence. However, the implications of prudence for political theory and practice are relatively underexplored. In <\/span>Neurofunctional Prudence and Morality: A Philosophical Theory<\/span><\/i> (Routledge, 2020), Marcus Arvan outlines a unified theory of prudence, morality, and justice informed by behavioral neuroscience, holding that prudence and morality ultimately support a broadly Rawlsian conception of justice as fairness. However, in <\/span>In the Shadow of Justice<\/span><\/i> (Princeton University Press, 2019), Katrina Forrester argues that Rawlsian liberalism is ill-suited to our current political moment: a volatile time of political crises in which more radical forms of political theorizing and action may be more (prudentially?) effective in achieving important forms of social and political change.\u00a0<\/span>\r\n\r\nThis MANCEPT panel invites submissions on prudence and politics broadly understood, including but not limited to the implications of theories of prudence for political theory and activism, as well as applied discussions of prudence and political issues (climate change, etc.). Contributions are welcome from a range of disciplines, including but not limited to philosophy, political science and theory, economics, sociology, and law.<\/span>\r\n\r\nPaper Submissions<\/b>:<\/b> This workshop is organized and convened by Dr. Marcus Arvan (University of Tampa). Papers will be given a 55 minute slot, consisting of a 35 minute paper and a 20 minute Q&A. To submit a paper plase send an abstract of 250 words to <\/span>marvan@ut.edu<\/span><\/a> by the deadline of 15th May 2021.<\/strong><\/span>\r\n\r\nGiven the continued uncertainty with the C-19 pandemic, and the success of hosting the 2020 workshops online, <\/span>MANCEPT be holding this year\u2019s event online<\/b>. MANCEPT offers fee-waiver bursaries to attend the conference (available for current graduate students only), and the application deadline for a bursary is 15 June 2021<\/strong>. To give presenters time to apply for one, authors chosen for the workshop will be informed of their paper acceptance by 8<\/strong><\/span> June 2021.<\/strong>","_et_gb_content_width":"","_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-2301","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.manchester.ac.uk\/mancept\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2301","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.manchester.ac.uk\/mancept\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.manchester.ac.uk\/mancept\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.manchester.ac.uk\/mancept\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4408"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.manchester.ac.uk\/mancept\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2301"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/sites.manchester.ac.uk\/mancept\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2301\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2627,"href":"https:\/\/sites.manchester.ac.uk\/mancept\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2301\/revisions\/2627"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.manchester.ac.uk\/mancept\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2301"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}