[et_pb_section fb_built=”1″ admin_label=”section” _builder_version=”3.0.47″][et_pb_row admin_label=”row” _builder_version=”3.0.48″ background_size=”initial” background_position=”top_left” background_repeat=”repeat”][et_pb_column type=”4_4″ _builder_version=”3.0.47″ parallax=”off” parallax_method=”on”][et_pb_text admin_label=”Text” _builder_version=”3.17.6″ background_size=”initial” background_position=”top_left” background_repeat=”repeat”]<\/p>\n
Convenors<\/b><\/p>\n
Giulio Fornaroli <\/b>(Universidad Nacional Aut\u00f3noma de M\u00e9xico)<\/p>\n
Cristi\u00e1n Rettig <\/b>(Universidad Adolfo Ib\u00e1\u00f1ez)<\/p>\n
Up to Date Confirmed Keynote Speakers <\/b><\/span><\/p>\n Renee Bolinger <\/b>(Princeton); Nicolas Cornell\u00a0 <\/b>(Michigan \u2013 Ann Arbor); Rowan Cruft <\/b>(Stirling); Matthew Kramer <\/b>(Cambridge); Saladin\u00a0 Meckled-Garica <\/b>(UCL); Laura Valentini <\/b>(LMU) *All times are British Summer Time (BST)<\/span><\/p>\n Start time 3 pm \u2013 End time 4.30 pm<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cRethinking Moral Claim Rights\u201d \u2013 Laura Valentini<\/strong> (LMU)<\/p>\n TBD \u2013 Saladin Meckled-Garcia<\/strong> (UCL)<\/p>\n Start time 4.40 pm \u2013 End time 7 pm<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cDirectedness, Rights, Interests, and Conditions for Cooperation\u201d \u2013 Guido L\u00f6hr<\/strong> (Eindhoven University of Technology)<\/p>\n \u201cChildren, the Unconscious, and the Dead: Consent and the Will Theory of Rights\u201d \u2013 Karamvir Chadha<\/strong> (Durham)<\/p>\n \u201cDirected Obligations, Recognition, and Moral Deliberation\u201d \u2013 Jonas Vandieken<\/strong> (LMU)<\/p>\n Start time 3 pm \u2013 End time 4.30 pm<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cRights and Right-Holding\u201d \u2013 Matthew Kramer<\/strong> (Cambridge)<\/p>\n \u201cCan There Be Positive Human Rights?\u201d \u2013 Adina Preda<\/strong> (TCD)<\/p>\n Start time 4.40 pm \u2013 End time 7 pm<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cTowards an Action-Guiding Theory of Human Rights\u201d \u2013 Cristi\u00e1n Rettig<\/strong> (Universidad Adolfo Ib\u00e1\u00f1ez)<\/p>\n \u201cRights Enable Agency\u201d \u2013 Siegfried Van Duffel<\/strong> (Nazarbayev University)<\/p>\n \u201cBentham\u2019s Test and the Protection of Interests\u201d \u2013 Simon Franz Ewers<\/strong> (Zurich)<\/p>\n Start time 3 pm \u2013 End time 4.30 pm<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cTBD\u201d \u2013 Rowan Cruft<\/strong> (Stirling)<\/p>\n \u201cMeaningful Rights Proclamations\u201d \u2013 Giulio Fornaroli<\/strong> (UNAM)<\/p>\n Start time 4.40 pm \u2013 End time 7 pm<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cRights and Action-Guidance\u201d \u2013 Nicolas Cornell<\/strong> (Michigan \u2013 Ann Arbor)<\/p>\n \u201cOwing Something to Another\u201d \u2013 Joseph Bowen<\/strong> (Stockholm)<\/p>\n \u201cNatural Rights and Normative Powers\u201d \u2013 Richard Healey<\/strong> (Roehampton)<\/p>\n Start time 3 pm \u2013 End time 4.30 pm<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cThe Social Approach to Rights\u201d \u2013 Renee Bolinger<\/strong> (Michigan \u2013 Ann Arbor)<\/p>\n \u201cRights in an Uncertain World\u201d \u2013 Chelsea Rosenthal<\/strong> (Simon Fraser)<\/p>\n Start time 4.40 pm \u2013 End time 7 pm<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cMoral Patients Who Shave with Occam\u2019s Razor: A Reductive Account of the Grounds of Rights\u201d \u2013 Matthew Perry<\/strong> (Manchester)<\/p>\n \u201cThe Razian\u2019s Elephant in the Room\u201d \u2013 Kimberley Brownlee<\/strong> (UBC)<\/p>\n Social Event\/Virtual Drinks TBD<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n The philosophy of rights in the last decades has been both prolific and deeply innovative. The\u00a0 will vs. interest debate still informs, in an always more sophisticated form, a good part of the\u00a0 scholarship. But recent accounts by authors such as Cruft, Gilbert, Sreenivasan and Wenar at tempt to overcome or radically reframe the debate.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n In the meantime, growing attention is being devoted to the concept of a directed duty. It\u00a0 is now commonly accepted that the duties correlating with claim-rights are characterized by an\u00a0 element of <\/span>direction <\/span><\/i>(they are to be discharged <\/span>for <\/span><\/i>the right-holder; they are owed <\/span>to <\/span><\/i>them)\u00a0 absent in generic ethical duties.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Directionality is increasingly taken as a crucial feature in the understanding of the <\/span>nature\u00a0 <\/span><\/i>of claim-rights. But what directed duties are is far from clear. Some understand directed duties as creating their own separate realm of bipolar or second-personal normativity that is irreduc ible to the third-personal normativity of general ethical norms. Ohers, however, (Darwall, Wal lace) argue that ethics in general is, at bottom, a second-personal exercise.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Equally ripe for debate is the relationship between directionality and interest or will\u00a0 theories. Is directionality a challenge for traditional will- and interest-accounts of the function\u00a0 of rights? Or is it, by contrast, an element of claim-rights that will and interest theories are per fectly fit to capture and explain (as argued by both Steiner and Kramer)?\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n And, how do these theoretical puzzles in the general philosophy of rights relate to ap plied questions about rights in legal theory? If directionality is indeed the core property of\u00a0 rights, what should we think of those rights that do not seem to involve bipolar normativity?\u00a0 Consider rights <\/span>in rem <\/span><\/i>such as those found in property or criminal law, which are directed\u00a0<\/span>against a collection of duty-bearers, consisting in the whole world. How should directionality\u00a0 be understood here?\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n A different question that has lately attracted renewed interest concerns <\/span>natural <\/span><\/i>rights.\u00a0 What role, if any, should they play in a general theory of rights? And, if we do not want to ex press outright skepticism about their function, what can we say about their <\/span>grounds<\/span><\/i>?\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Finally, is there anything about the concept of a right that determines which entities can\u00a0 be holders of rights? Interest and will theorists have traditionally answered differently to this\u00a0 question, and it is far from obvious how authors who take inspiration from directionality can\u00a0 use that paradigm to tell us whether non-human animals, or group agents, or the future gener<\/span>ations and the dead, or maybe even natural elements and human artefacts can hold rights.\u00a0 The workshop welcomes any contribution which aims at answering <\/span>these and related\u00a0 questions <\/i><\/b>about the nature and function of rights.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n To apply, please send a <\/span>300-400-word abstract <\/b>to <\/span>rightsmancept2021@gmail.com <\/span><\/a>by 15<\/b>th<\/b> May<\/b>. We aspire to give around 40 minutes (inclusive of both presentation and Q&A) per paper.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Registration will open in May<\/strong>. All participants must register in order to attend. <\/span><\/p>\n This year\u2019s fees are\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n Academics: \u00a345\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Graduate students, retirees, and unaffiliated attendees: \u00a320\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Non-speaker\/non-presenting attendees: \u00a315\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n A small number of bursaries (for graduate students only) are available. Please state in your\u00a0 application to our panel whether you intend to apply for a bursary.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n We look forward to reading your abstracts,\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Giulio and Cristi\u00e1n.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n [\/et_pb_text][\/et_pb_column][\/et_pb_row][\/et_pb_section]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" State of the Art: The Nature and Function of Rights Convenors Giulio Fornaroli (Universidad Nacional Aut\u00f3noma de M\u00e9xico) Cristi\u00e1n Rettig (Universidad Adolfo Ib\u00e1\u00f1ez) Up to Date Confirmed Keynote Speakers Renee Bolinger (Princeton); Nicolas Cornell\u00a0 (Michigan \u2013 Ann Arbor); Rowan Cruft (Stirling); Matthew Kramer (Cambridge); Saladin\u00a0 Meckled-Garica (UCL); Laura Valentini (LMU) *All times are British Summer […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4408,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"on","_et_pb_old_content":"Convenors<\/b>\r\n\r\nGiulio Fornaroli <\/b>(Universidad Nacional Aut\u00f3noma de M\u00e9xico)\r\n\r\nCristi\u00e1n Rettig <\/b>(Universidad Adolfo Ib\u00e1\u00f1ez)\r\n\r\n
<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n
\nTuesday 7th September<\/h4>\n
Session 1<\/em><\/h6>\n
Session 2<\/em><\/h6>\n
Wednesday 8th September<\/h4>\n
Session 3<\/em><\/h6>\n
Session 4<\/em><\/h6>\n
Thursday 9th September<\/h4>\n
Session 5<\/em><\/h6>\n
Session 6<\/em><\/h6>\n
Friday 10th September<\/h4>\n
Session 7<\/em><\/h6>\n
Session 8<\/em><\/h6>\n
\r\n\r\nUp to Date Confirmed Keynote Speakers: Renee Bolinger (Princeton), Nicolas Cornell\u00a0 (Michigan \u2013 Ann Arbor), Rowan Cruft (Stirling), Matthew Kramer (Cambridge), Saladin\u00a0 Meckled-Garica (UCL), and Laura Valentini (LMU).\u00a0\u00a0<\/b><\/span>\r\n\r\nThe philosophy of rights in the last decades has been both prolific and deeply innovative. The\u00a0 will vs. interest debate still informs, in an always more sophisticated form, a good part of the\u00a0 scholarship. But recent accounts by authors such as Cruft, Gilbert, Sreenivasan and Wenar at tempt to overcome or radically reframe the debate.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>\r\n\r\nIn the meantime, growing attention is being devoted to the concept of a directed duty. It\u00a0 is now commonly accepted that the duties correlating with claim-rights are characterized by an\u00a0 element of <\/span>direction <\/span><\/i>(they are to be discharged <\/span>for <\/span><\/i>the right-holder; they are owed <\/span>to <\/span><\/i>them)\u00a0 absent in generic ethical duties.\u00a0<\/span>\r\n\r\nDirectionality is increasingly taken as a crucial feature in the understanding of the <\/span>nature\u00a0 <\/span><\/i>of claim-rights. But what directed duties are is far from clear. Some understand directed duties as creating their own separate realm of bipolar or second-personal normativity that is irreduc ible to the third-personal normativity of general ethical norms. Ohers, however, (Darwall, Wal lace) argue that ethics in general is, at bottom, a second-personal exercise.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>\r\n\r\nEqually ripe for debate is the relationship between directionality and interest or will\u00a0 theories. Is directionality a challenge for traditional will- and interest-accounts of the function\u00a0 of rights? Or is it, by contrast, an element of claim-rights that will and interest theories are per fectly fit to capture and explain (as argued by both Steiner and Kramer)?\u00a0<\/span>\r\n\r\nAnd, how do these theoretical puzzles in the general philosophy of rights relate to ap plied questions about rights in legal theory? If directionality is indeed the core property of\u00a0 rights, what should we think of those rights that do not seem to involve bipolar normativity?\u00a0 Consider rights <\/span>in rem <\/span><\/i>such as those found in property or criminal law, which are directed\u00a0<\/span>against a collection of duty-bearers, consisting in the whole world. How should directionality\u00a0 be understood here?\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>\r\n\r\nA different question that has lately attracted renewed interest concerns <\/span>natural <\/span><\/i>rights.\u00a0 What role, if any, should they play in a general theory of rights? And, if we do not want to ex press outright skepticism about their function, what can we say about their <\/span>grounds<\/span><\/i>?\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>\r\n\r\nFinally, is there anything about the concept of a right that determines which entities can\u00a0 be holders of rights? Interest and will theorists have traditionally answered differently to this\u00a0 question, and it is far from obvious how authors who take inspiration from directionality can\u00a0 use that paradigm to tell us whether non-human animals, or group agents, or the future gener<\/span>ations and the dead, or maybe even natural elements and human artefacts can hold rights.\u00a0 The workshop welcomes any contribution which aims at answering <\/span>these and related\u00a0 questions <\/i><\/b>about the nature and function of rights.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>\r\n\r\nTo apply, please send a <\/span>300-400-word abstract <\/b>to <\/span>rightsmancept2021@gmail.com <\/span><\/a>by 15<\/b>th<\/b> May<\/b>. We aspire to give around 40 minutes (inclusive of both presentation and Q&A) per paper.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>\r\n\r\nRegistration will open in May<\/strong>. All participants must register in order to attend. <\/span>\r\n\r\nThis year\u2019s fees are\u00a0<\/strong>\r\n\r\nAcademics: \u00a345\u00a0<\/span>\r\n\r\nGraduate students, retirees, and unaffiliated attendees: \u00a320\u00a0<\/span>\r\n\r\nNon-speaker\/non-presenting attendees: \u00a315\u00a0<\/span>\r\n\r\nA small number of bursaries (for graduate students only) are available. Please state in your\u00a0 application to our panel whether you intend to apply for a bursary.\u00a0<\/span>\r\n\r\nWe look forward to reading your abstracts,\u00a0<\/span>\r\n\r\nGiulio and Cristi\u00e1n.\u00a0<\/span>","_et_gb_content_width":"","_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-2318","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.manchester.ac.uk\/mancept\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2318","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.manchester.ac.uk\/mancept\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.manchester.ac.uk\/mancept\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.manchester.ac.uk\/mancept\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4408"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.manchester.ac.uk\/mancept\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2318"}],"version-history":[{"count":11,"href":"https:\/\/sites.manchester.ac.uk\/mancept\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2318\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2617,"href":"https:\/\/sites.manchester.ac.uk\/mancept\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2318\/revisions\/2617"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.manchester.ac.uk\/mancept\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2318"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}