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MANCEPT / MANCEPT Workshops / List of Panels (A-Z) 2024 / Group Agency in Political Theory

Group Agency in Political Theory

 

Alexander Bryan (University of Cambridge)

 

Building on developments in social ontology (List & Pettit, 2012; Tollefsen, 2005), in recent years political philosophers have become increasingly interested in the concept of group agency. The idea that groups, constituted in certain ways, can hold representational and motivational states, pursue goals, and act in ways which are not entirely reducible to the mental states or action of individual members has significant implications for political theory. Indeed, many of the most common examples given of group agents are of groups or institutions which are of major political significance, including business corporations, political parties, and states themselves. The application of group agency theory to such institutions raises a number of questions in political theory. Some of these questions relate to the duties and rights that groups might hold, and how the burdens of satisfying these duties can be justly distributed among members, in particular in relation to historical and ongoing injustices committed by the state (Lawford-Smith, 2019; Collins, 2022; Pasternak, 2021). Some are conceptual, concerning the nature of the group agency exhibited by different kinds of political groups, and whether they are in fact group agents at all (Moen, 2024; Pettit, 2023). Others concern the implications of conceiving of states and other political groups as group agents for our theories of other political concepts such as legitimacy, justice, egalitarianism, and democracy (Applbaum, 2019; Lovett, 2020; Lovett & Zuehl, 2022).

This panel would aim to bring together theorists working across all areas of political philosophy on conceptual and normative questions relating to the application of group agency theory. Submissions would be invited on any topics in which the concept of group agency bears on questions in political philosophy. Potential topics include, but are not limited to:

 

  • Which political groups and institutions (states, corporations, political parties, multinational organisations, courts, etc) can be thought of as group agents, if any.
  • The duties of corporations, and how this relates to their regulation.
  • The duties of political group agents, such as political parties and states.
  • Whether group agency provide a basis for the granting of political rights (such as the right to vote), or other kinds of non-political rights.
  • The blameworthiness of group agents in general, or of particular kinds of political group agents.
  • How the burdens involved in discharging the duties held by the state should be distributed among members
  • The relationship between the beliefs of groups and the beliefs of members in political contexts
  • Group agency in theories of legitimacy.
  • Justifications for democracy relating to group agency.

 

 

 


Wednesday 4th September

11:00-12:30

Registration

12:30-13:30

Lunch

13:30-14:00

Welcome Speech

14:00-16:00

Session 1

Camila Flowerman: Blaming Weakness of Political Will: Normative implications for Weak-Willed Political Agents

Miikka Oscar Jaarte: Can Diffuse Groups Dominate?

16:00-16:30

Tea and Coffee Break (optional)

16:30-17:30

Session 1 (continued)

Katharine Browne: Collective Attention: What It Is and Why It Matters

17:45-19:00

Wine Reception

19:30

Conference Dinner


Thursday 5th September

9:30-11:30

Session 2

David Storrs-Fox: How to Hold Mixed AI-Human Groups Responsible?

Michael Da Silva: The Moral Status of Responsibility Gaps

11:30-12:00

Tea and Coffee Break (optional)

12:00-13:00

Session 2 (continued)

Stephan Stephanides: Political Implications of Group Agency in Plato’s Republic

13:00-14:00

Lunch

14:00-16:00

Session 3

Evrensel Sebep: The Citizenry’s Collective Agency and Responsibility

Bill Wringe: Collective Agency Meets Political Realism: Joint Commitments as a Distinctive Source of Political Normativity

16:00-16:30

Tea and Coffee Break

16:30-17:30

Session 3 (continued)

Frank Hindriks: Corporate Moral Duties without Rights: Two Asymmetry Theses


Friday 6th September

9:30-11:30

Session 4

Spencer Albert: State Responsibility and Fragmented Action

Brookes Brown: Political Authority, Group Agency, and the Problem of the State

11:30-12:00

Tea and Coffee Break

12:00-13:00

Session 4 (continued)

Kaveh Pourvand: Social Complexity and the Emergent State

 

 

 

 

 

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