New Directions in the Philosophy of Electoral Participation

As electoral turnout declines in democracies around the world, electoral participation has become a focal point in normative political theory and a body of work has emerged on the philosophy of electoral participation. This panel covers new developments within this field of inquiry, inviting contributions that explore novel problems or develop new approaches to established topics in the philosophy of electoral participation.

Theorists of electoral participation have so far particularly sought to understand whether voting in democratic elections is morally obligatory for individual citizens. Some scholars have argued for this view based on the moral value of fairness, citizens’ moral duty of non- complicity, as well as their duties of civic excellence and Samaritan easy aid. By contrast, others have countered these arguments with numerous objections and instead asserted citizens’ moral right not to vote, or more strongly still their duty to not vote.

Within the philosophy of electoral participation, there is extensive discussion also about public policies that make turnout in elections legally obligatory. Advocates of such policies notably argue that compulsory voting is justified on the grounds of fairness, democratic legitimacy, non-domination, and political equality. Critics, on the other hand, meet these arguments with various objections and instead defend voluntary voting and/or policies that boost turnout non- coercively, e.g. through financial incentives.

However, compulsory voting and the ethics of voting in democratic elections do not exhaust the array of issues that are interesting in electoral participation. The philosophy of electoral participation raises other puzzles, too. For example, what are citizens’ moral, participatory rights and duties in democratically regressing or undemocratic contexts? Are there special moral responsibilities for representatives who are elected in contests with low turnout? Can democratic states justifiably impose quorum conditions in elections, as they often do in referenda? Are there any cogent arguments for non-conventional institutional responses to non- voting, such as representing non-votes in elections with empty seats? To what extent are campaigning politicians morally permitted to encourage non-voting, either among supporters of rival candidates, or more widely to depress participation below applicable quorum thresholds? Are representative politicians morally permitted to not participate in votes that take place within their representative institutions, e.g. parliamentary votes on a bill?

Such questions remain overlooked within the philosophical scholarship on electoral participation, and a key purpose of this panel is to remedy that lacuna. Bringing together contributions that discuss not only compulsory voting and the ethics of participation in democratic elections, but also entirely novel questions about electoral participation, the panel aims to stimulate work that explores various new directions in the philosophy of electoral participation.

Potential paper topics include but are not limited to:

• novel approaches to the ethics of participation in democratic elections;

• novel approaches to compulsory voting;

• the ethics of participation in democratically regressing/non-democratic elections;

• the ethics of electoral participation beyond the context of general elections (e.g. referenda; local or supernational elections);

• turnout policies beyond compulsory voting;

• the ethics of being a low-turnout electee;

• the ethics of advocating for non-voting;

• the ethics of representatives’ (non)voting.