Vulnerability and Relational Equality

Giacomo Floris (University of Hamburg); Costanza Porro (University of Manchester)

Arthur Lewis Building: Room 2.036

The concepts of vulnerability and that of relational equality have been attracting growing interest in recent years. Human vulnerability is regarded by philosophers (Mackenzie 2014; Straehle 2017) and legal theorists (Fineman 2008) as central to rethinking the conception of the person, the subject of the law and thus the obligations that institutions have towards their citizens. Further, for many, vulnerability represents a novel perspective from which to reflect on a variety of problems in moral and political philosophy, such as the nature of autonomy (J. Anderson and Honneth 2005), and different fields of bioethics, research ethics and health ethics (Rogers, MacKenzie, and Dodds 2012). On the other hand, the concept of equality, hithereto most often defined as a matter of distribution of certain goods, has been reconceptualised as an analysis of the quality of social relations (E. S. Anderson 1999; Wolff 1998; Schemmel 2021). Political philosophers working in this new egalitarian vein have explored the nature of relational equality and egalitarian relationships, and their implications in all domains of social life. However, despite their growing popularity and the many ways in which the concept of vulnerability and the conceptualization of relational equality can inform each other, the potential connections between these ideas are rarely if ever discussed (Garrau and Laborde 2015).   

The aim of this workshop is contribute to the debates about individual vulnerability and relational equality by bringing them into dialogue. Specifically, we invite contributions that address, but are not limited to, the following questions:  

• Can the notion of human vulnerability shed novel light on the requirements of a society of equals?   
• Which conceptions of vulnerability is best suited to illuminate the demands of relational equality? 
• What are the social conditions necessary to achieve a society in which everyone can fully participate and stand in relations of equality with each other in light of our vulnerability? 
• Should we only focus on society-wide policies or are other measures needed to contrast problematic vulnerabilities?  
• Is vulnerability to oppressive relationships wrong in and of itself in all circumstances?
• What does an egalitarian society owe to its most vulnerable members if they are to be considered and treated as equals?  
• What are the social arrangements that a society of equals ought to put in place in order to ameliorate the social condition of its most vulnerable members?  
• Is vulnerability always incompatible with an egalitarian relationship?