State of the Art: The Nature and Function of Rights
Giulio Fornaroli (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México)
Cristián Rettig (Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez)
Up to Date Confirmed Keynote Speakers
Renee Bolinger (Princeton); Nicolas Cornell (Michigan – Ann Arbor); Rowan Cruft (Stirling); Matthew Kramer (Cambridge); Saladin Meckled-Garica (UCL); Laura Valentini (LMU)
The philosophy of rights in the last decades has been both prolific and deeply innovative. The will vs. interest debate still informs, in an always more sophisticated form, a good part of the scholarship. But recent accounts by authors such as Cruft, Gilbert, Sreenivasan and Wenar at tempt to overcome or radically reframe the debate.
In the meantime, growing attention is being devoted to the concept of a directed duty. It is now commonly accepted that the duties correlating with claim-rights are characterized by an element of direction (they are to be discharged for the right-holder; they are owed to them) absent in generic ethical duties.
Directionality is increasingly taken as a crucial feature in the understanding of the nature of claim-rights. But what directed duties are is far from clear. Some understand directed duties as creating their own separate realm of bipolar or second-personal normativity that is irreduc ible to the third-personal normativity of general ethical norms. Ohers, however, (Darwall, Wal lace) argue that ethics in general is, at bottom, a second-personal exercise.
Equally ripe for debate is the relationship between directionality and interest or will theories. Is directionality a challenge for traditional will- and interest-accounts of the function of rights? Or is it, by contrast, an element of claim-rights that will and interest theories are per fectly fit to capture and explain (as argued by both Steiner and Kramer)?
And, how do these theoretical puzzles in the general philosophy of rights relate to ap plied questions about rights in legal theory? If directionality is indeed the core property of rights, what should we think of those rights that do not seem to involve bipolar normativity? Consider rights in rem such as those found in property or criminal law, which are directed against a collection of duty-bearers, consisting in the whole world. How should directionality be understood here?
A different question that has lately attracted renewed interest concerns natural rights. What role, if any, should they play in a general theory of rights? And, if we do not want to ex press outright skepticism about their function, what can we say about their grounds?
Finally, is there anything about the concept of a right that determines which entities can be holders of rights? Interest and will theorists have traditionally answered differently to this question, and it is far from obvious how authors who take inspiration from directionality can use that paradigm to tell us whether non-human animals, or group agents, or the future generations and the dead, or maybe even natural elements and human artefacts can hold rights. The workshop welcomes any contribution which aims at answering these and related questions about the nature and function of rights.
To apply, please send a 300-400-word abstract to firstname.lastname@example.org by 15th May. We aspire to give around 40 minutes (inclusive of both presentation and Q&A) per paper.
Registration will open in May. All participants must register in order to attend.
This year’s fees are
Graduate students, retirees, and unaffiliated attendees: £20
Non-speaker/non-presenting attendees: £15
A small number of bursaries (for graduate students only) are available. Please state in your application to our panel whether you intend to apply for a bursary.
We look forward to reading your abstracts,
Giulio and Cristián.